28 Şubat 2012 Salı

New Energy Geopolitics: Turkey as Energy Hub

New Energy Geopolitics: Turkey as Energy Hub "
For the Turkish government, there are two primary reasons to make the country an energy hub, a transit route for the so-called "fourth corridor" of gas suppliers in the Middle East and the Caspian basin (Norway, Algeria and Russia being the other three corridors). The first is to guarantee the security of supply, particularly for gas. The Turkish government has always insisted on the right to take some of the gas in transit pipelines for their own consumption, known as offtake rights. The second reason is to gain political influence in Europe and in the region due to the ownership of a key infrastructure route.
Politics will dictate the development of the gas corridors, in particular the relationship with Russia, and the problems in securing gas supplies. For Russia, energy policy and foreign policy are interrelated.31 The same is true for Turkey. By becoming the center of the transit routes for hydrocarbons between the Caspian, the Middle East and Europe, Turkey will be able to increase its influence in the region. This would allow Turkey to leverage the government's policy, formulated by foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, of "zero problems with neighbors," in many cases the neighbors that will be supplying the hydrocarbons.
After the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the 2009 dispute between Russia and Ukraine, which led to the shutting off of a major part of European gas imports, the EU realized it needed to diversify its supplies of natural gas, a goal that will become more critical as the demand for gas is growing in Europe just as domestic supplies are depleted.32 Turkey could present itself as the solution to Europe's energy problems.
There are a number of pipeline projects being considered that are designed to turn Turkey into an energy hub. The first is the Interconnector-Turkey-GreeceItaly (ITGI) gas pipeline. This project is an extension of the Turkey-Greece gas pipeline, which brings gas from Azerbaijan to Greece, to southern Italy and then to the European network. The project, led by the Italian utility Edison, DEPA (the Greek public pipeline corporation) and BOTAÇ (Boru Hatlari ile Petrol Tarima Anonim §irketi, the state-owned Turkish pipeline company) envisages 8 billion cubic meters a year of gas moving from Azerbaijan to Italy through Turkey and Greece starting in 2015, increasing to 15 billion cubic meters a year.33
A much more ambitious proposal is the Nabucco gas pipeline, a 7.9 billion euro project to build a 30 billion cubic meter a year pipeline from Turkey up through the Balkans to Austria. The project is supported by BOTAÇ, Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH), the Austrian OMV, the Hungarian MOL, the Romanian Transgaz, and the German utility RWE. The European Commission supports the project. Azerbaijan would supply the gas in the initial stages, and then possibly Turkmenistan, and potentially later Iran, Iraq and Egypt. Construction is due to start in 2011, with gas flowing as of 2014: 34
Despite the potential of these projects, Russia has historically held the monopoly on imports of Eurasian natural gas to Europe through its Soviet-era pipeline network, now owned by Gazprom, and this has given the country a strong geopolitical influence. It is an influence that Russia wants to retain. And after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the message was clear: Russia has the military power and will to dictate terms in its near abroad when it feels its position is weakening. The Turkish government is clearly aware of this message.
Russia's attempt to maintain its monopoly on the supply and transportation of Eurasian gas can be seen in the Russian-proposed South Stream gas pipeline, a pipeline that could potentially compete with Nabucco. The South Stream project is a proposed 60 billion cubic meters a year natural gas pipeline running under the Black Sea, thereby bypassing Ukraine, and exporting Russian and Central Asian gas. The project is led by Gazprom and Eni, an Italian energy company, and is expected to cost 20 billion euros. The Austrian company OMV, also a partner on the Nabucco pipeline, recently joined the consortium, as well as Slovenia, Croatia and EdF from France. Construction is due to start in 201 1, with the initial stages completed by 2015.35
Russia works to entice suppliers into using its pipelines using both threats and promises. The 2008 Georgian war was the threat, when it became clear that pipelines in the region were potentially vulnerable. The promise was commercially attractive terms. In other words, Russia wanted to give the message that it was willing to use force to keep its influence, but cooperative countries would benefit. In 2009, Russia told the Azerbaijani government that it would be willing to purchase all its gas production at European "net back" prices, the sales price in Europe, minus transportation charges, which was much higher than what Turkey was paying for gas at the time. In 2009, the Azerbaijani government agreed to export a small quantity of gas, 0.5 billion cubic meters a year, through Gazprom's networks.36
The Azeri decision to export small quantities through Russia can also be seen as a way for the Azerbaijan government to force Turkey to accept a new pricing deal. Under the original contract for the BTE pipeline, Turkey was paying US$100 to US$120 per thousand cubic meters, much lower than contracted prices in Europe. In May 2010, it was reported that Turkey agreed to pay US$220 per thousand cubic meters.37 This price is very similar to US$230 per thousand cubic meters agreed between Russia and Ukraine in April 2010, a price that was considered roughly equal to the price charged in Europe, minus the extra transportation charges.38 Therefore, by agreeing to export gas to Russia, Azerbaijan was able to both mollify the Russians and force Turkey to agree to pay European contract prices for its gas.
The Azeri situation must be taken into consideration by the Turkish government as a challenge to its energy security goals. And suppliers apart from Azerbaijan will be required for Turkey to become an energy hub. There are realistically two countries: Iran and Turkmenistan. At present, Turkmenistan, which has perhaps the fifth largest gas reserves in the world is diversifying from its traditional export route through Russia by building pipelines to China and Iran, as well as agreeing to look into building a pipeline across the Caspian to supply the Nabucco pipeline and continuing to export through Russia. By diversifying the countries it supplies, Turkmenistan would be able to balance Russian influence with Chinese, while keeping on good terms with the West.
Iran has the third largest gas reserves in the world, according to BP, which, due to US sanctions, have not been largely exploited. Also, since 2001 Iran has been exporting gas to Turkey. The Iranian government has offered TPAO (Tiirkiye Petrolieri Anonim Ortakhgi, the Turkish state-owned oil and gas company) development concession on its South Pars gas field, one of the largest in the world, to gain support from Turkey to oppose the US sanctions.39 Iraq could be another supplier, and oil is intermittently shipped via pipeline through Turkey to the port of Ceyhan. However, the pipelines in Iraq are subject to numerous attacks, and until the situation in that country is resolved, the required investment in pipeline construction and developing the resource base is unlikely to be forthcoming.
To sum up the challenges Turkey in becoming an energy hub, the primary goal of all these exporting and importing countries is to avoid reliance on Russia and to pursue their own particular political goals. Azerbaijan agrees both to send gas to Russia and to Turkey, which avoids conflict and gives it a good bargaining position for prices; Turkmenistan wants to have all the big regional powers reliant on its gas; Austria agrees to participate in both the South Stream and the Nabucco projects. Even Turkey, while primarily supporting the Nabucco project, has agreed to let South Stream be developed in its territorial waters.40 The Turkish government is also continuing to negotiate a contract for Russia to develop a nuclear power plant in Mersin, further drawing in Russian involvement in the energy sector.41 Only Iran seems to have a single objective: Undercut US sanctions and develop its own gas fields to increase revenue. All of these arrangements are also affected by the current low price in natural gas, due to reduced demand because of the recession and an increase in US unconventional shale gas production.42 As a result it is unclear if there will be sufficient demand, never mind supply, to develop all the proposed projects.
At the moment there are competing projects - South Stream and Nabucco primarily - and the Turkish government appears to be supporting both. Azerbaijan and some EU member states and companies are also following this strategy. There is a lack of coherent strategy on the part of Turkey as the government is looking at short-term objectives such as trying to increase the speed of EU accession negotiations, negotiate a low price for Azerbaijani gas, and to keep on good relations with Russia. The same considerations can be seen in terms of nuclear power: the Turkish government is having Russia develop one plant, and South Korea another. This lack of a coherent long-term strategy means that the Turkish government is primarily responding to events instead of influencing them. The development of Turkey into an energy hub would reinforce two major policy objectives of the government: ensuring the security of supply and increasing connections with its neighbors and the EU. Without a coherent strategy these goals will be difficult to attain.

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